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Immigration and the Export Decision to the Home Country
Pamina Koenig ∗
Abstract
This paper analyzes the effect of immigrants’ networks on the decision of individual
firms to starting exporting to the immigrants’ home country. Existing evidence on the
trade-creating effect of immigrants show a robust effect, however at the national or regional
level. Using French exports at the firm-level to 61 countries, I find that increasing the
number of foreign immigrants in the region by 10 % increases the probability that a firm
starts exporting to the immigrants’ home country by 1.2%. MOre, the effect of immigrants
is enhanced when immigrants are older or more educated. The effect of immigrants also
varies among origin countries.
J.E.L. classification: F1, R12, L25
Keywords: export decision, networks, export market, immigration.
1 Introduction
In parallel to the complaints of the French government about the poor export performance
of French firms in terms of volumes and in terms of markets, recently published studies by
the French administration point to key factors underlying the dynamism of a subset of firms.
In particular, one key factor emphasized by a study of the Parisian commercial court is the
presence, in the same region, of a large number of firms headed by foreign immigrants. “In
Paris, there has been between 2000 and 2004 a 56% increase in the number firms created or
managed by Chinese immigrants, while the number of firms managed by French citizens has
decreased by 2.99%. 41% of the firms headed by Chinese entrepreneurs are involved in importing
and exporting”, reports the study.
Immigrants can impact local export performance by transferring information to local en-
trepreneurs about the preferences of the consumers in their home country. From an economic
policy perspective, it is therefore important to learn and emphasize the mechanism through
∗University Paris West and Paris School of Economics, France. Email: pkoenig@u-paris10.fr. I thank Andrew
Clark, Megan MacGarvie, and participants of the PSE seminar for helpful comments and suggestions.
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which these networks based on the country-specific knowledge of immigrants can enhance ex-
port flows. Assessing whether immigrants generate higher trade, and identifying the mechanisms
of the diffusion of information can participate in the development of industrial policies as the
ones recently launched by the French ministry of finance on competitiveness clusters1. From an
academic point of view, assessing the importance of immigrants networks as a channel to reduce
information costs allows to complete the knowledge on the structure of trade costs. Indeed, trade
costs can be described as comprising three types of costs (Head, 2004): freight costs associated
to moving goods across distances, trade policy costs linked to the crossing of national borders,
and transaction costs related to the buying/seling process and the gathering of information.
The components of the latter category have been investigated by a number of empirical studies
using the traditional gravity equation applied to international trade. As a consequence, spatial
proximity between exporters and importers is now known to reduce not only freight costs but
also information costs. More specifically, a recent strand of the literature surveyed by Rauch
(2001) and Wagner, Head and Ries (2002) emphasizes the role of social and ethnic networks in
reducing transaction costs linked to the research of information.
In this paper, using firm-level data on French exports to 61 foreign markets, I build on
this recent literature and investigate whether the presence of foreign immigrants in a given
region encourages local firms to start exporting to the immigrants’ home country. The existing
literature provides strong support for the hypothesis of immigrants networks effects on trade.
Following the survey by Wagner et al. (2002) and adding some recent studies, we can summarize
the main findings of the literature in two points. First, the existing studies have found a robust
link between the presence of immigrants in a region and trade. Gould (1994) is among the first to
use a gravity-type equation and incorporate the stock of migrants as an explanatory variable. His
specification allows for a non-constant elasticity of trade with respect to the stock of immigrants.
His results, on U.S. trade with 47 trading partners, show a positive link between both variables,
with a decreasing elasticity with the number of immigrants. Head and Ries (1998), based on
an augmented gravity equation, study Canadian trade with 136 partners from 1980 to 1992.
They find a positive relationship between immigration and Canadian bilateral trade. Dunlevy
and Hutchinson (1999) focus on American imports in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, and find that the stock of migrants residing in the U.S. played an important role in
determining aggregate imports, with some variation across periods of time and countries. Girma
and Yu (2002) build on the precedent analysis by investigating immigrants effects on trade using
1www.competitivite.gouv.fr
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U.K. data. Again, the effect is found to be positive and very robust. Rauch and Trindade (2002)
analyse the link between the presence of Chinese residents and world bilateral trade. They
find that country pairs with higher concentrations of Chinese residents trade more with each
other. Combes, Lafourcade and Mayer (2004) are the first to explore the existence of migrants
networks at the regional level inside a country. They study intranational trade between French
de´partements and show, using different specifications closely derived from theory, that the stock
of migrants coming from other de´partements, as well as business networks, influence bilateral
trade at the de´partement level. Wagner, Head, and Ries (2002) analyse the variation in trade
and immigration across Canadian Provinces and find a positive impact of foreign immigrants
on trade, with different estimation procedures. Evidence from Germany is provided by Godart
and Toubal (2005), on exports from German States to 58 partners countries from 1992 to 2001.
Note that instead of using the stock of immigrants, they use the share of immigrants in the
State population as an explanatory variable. Finally, Herander and Saavedra (2005) explore the
structure of immigrants networks by studying how U.S. States’ immigrants populations affect
other States’ export volumes. They first confirm the role of immigrants as increasing trade flows
and then find that US state populations of immigrants have a greater influence on state exports
than do out-of-state immigrants.
The second robust result present in the literature concerns the determinants of the immi-
grants effects on trade. Indeed the influence of immigrants on trade flows can be expected
to vary according to immigrants’ characteristics (age, education level, professional status...),
to the characteristics of the traded goods (homogenous versus differentiated goods), or to the
characteristics of destination countries (countries with low/strong ties to the host country). For
example, Canadian immigration categorizes immigrants into three classes: family, refugee and
independent, with the latter category corresponding to skilled immigrants, selected according
to education and business occupation. Head and Ries (1998) find that the effect on trade varies
with the class of immigrants, with independent having the largest impact. Evidence on country-
varying effects of immigrants is provided by two studies. Head and Ries (1998) further show,
without however expecting any specific geographical feature of the immigrants effect, that East
Asian immigrants have more impact on Canadian trade than immigrants from other regions of
the world. Immigrants from European Eastern Countries are the only ones to exhibit a nega-
tive effect on trade flows. Girma and Yu distinguish between immigrants from Commonwealth
and non-Commonwealth countries, and find that the latter have the strongest impact on trade.
They interpret the result as immigrants from former U.K. colonies not bringing any valuable
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information to reduce an already low transaction cost. Godart and Toubal (2005) use both the
country-specific immigrants variable and a general variable representing foreign population and
investigate the nature of immigrants networks. It appears that only immigrants from the same
country of export have an impact on trade flows. Herander and Saavedra (2005) propose the
same experiment on US States export flows, with a qualitatively similar result.
The literature thus provides strong evidence of a positive impact of immigrants on trade, and
suggests some stylized facts as well as robust results concerning the nature of the immigrants
networks. While all the existing studies examine these effects at the aggregate and industry
level, in this paper I propose to analyse their relevance at the firm-level. Indeed, if immigrants
networks effects are to impact aggregate trade flows, it must be that individual firms are influ-
enced in their export behavior by the presence of immigrants. At the firm-level, two elements
are likely to be impacted: The decision to export to a given country, hence the number of ex-
porting firms, and the volume exported by each firm. In this paper I study whether immigrants
impact the decision to export, more precisely the decision to start exporting to a given country,
and leave the analysis of individual export volumes for further work. Studying the decision to
start exporting is interesting in two aspects. First, it allows to focus on a very intuitive channel
through which immigrants can affect trade, which is by encouraging new firms to export to
their home country. Second, it complements our knowledge on the mechanisms through which
immigrants affect aggregate trade, and opens a path towards understanding whether the role of
immigrants affect primarily the intensive or the extensive margins of trade.
Based on a trade model in monopolistic competition, in section 2 I explain how I model the
export behavior of the firm and how immigrants networks impact the export decision. Section
3 details the sources of data and highlights some stylized facts concerning the distribution of
immigrants across French departements. Then in section 4 I estimate the impact of immigrants
on a firm export behavior, using a logit model. Results are displayed and I explain how I
control for other variables that could also affect both the presence of immigrants and the export
decision. In section 5, I investigate how the effect of immigrants on firm-level trade varies with
immigrants’ characteristics such as age and education. Then I study how the effect changes
according to industry. Indeed, immigrants are likely to have more impact on trade in the case of
differentiated goods than for homogenous products, because immigrants are expected to reduce
information costs for the goods where information is necessary and most valuable. Finally, I
show how immigrants impact trade differently according to the importing country.
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2 The empirical model
In the following I describe the theoretical framework from which I derive the expressions for the
export decision of the firm. I model the firm’s behavior using a model of trade in monopolistic
competition in which firms are heterogeneous. In this setting, operating firms face two different
fixed costs. The first is the fixed production cost, faced by all firms that sell at least domestically.
The second one is the fixed cost at exporting, f , which the firms have to pay the first year they
sell on foreign markets. In a given sector, firms differ by their marginal cost ai, where ai is
the number of units of labor necessary to produce one unit of the good. Hence the lower the
marginal cost, the more productive the firm, and the more the firm is able to sell on a given
market. This also explains that not all firms sell on each market, since a lot of them are not
able to make sufficient profits to pass the productivity threshold.
In the following I will develop the expression for the profit of the firm abroad, describe how
the firm chooses to sell on foreign markets and model the probability to export. Before that,
let us make two remarks relative to the link between the theory and the empirical work.
The first point refers to the empirical handling of the fixed cost at exporting. Indeed, let us
consider a firm i facing the decision of exporting or not to a country j. By exporting to that
country, the firm is able to make an annual profit equal to Πij . However, if the firm has never
exported to that country before, it must incur a sunk cost f to cover the cost of entering the
market. For each year and country, there will thus be firms that continue and firms that start to
export to that country, corresponding to firms that have already paid the sunk cost and those
that have not. This asymmetry between the continuers and the starters becomes a problem
for the estimation precisely because this sunk cost is not observed: we have no information on
which firms have paid the sunk cost and which ones have not. Therefore, we must find a variable
to distinguish the continuers from the starters, because this asymmetry is in itself a potential
reason for which to remain on the export market in year t. If not controlled for, it could bias the
estimates of the firm level variables coefficients. Following Roberts and Tybout (1997), most
of the empirical literature on the export decision uses the lagged export status as a proxy for
those firms. However, as noted by Robert and Tybout (1997) and Bernard and Jensen (2004),
the use of this variable creates substantial econometric difficulties because the identification of
the spillovers also requires the specification to control for unobserved firm heterogeneity.
The approach chosen in this paper is to consider only the firms that start to export to a
given market. Doing so handles the asymmetry between the firms, because none of the firms
in the remaining sample have paid the sunk cost. Hence, all the firms have the same lagged
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export status, and this element will not be part of the possible determinants of the probability
to export. Of course, the consequence of considering the decision to start exporting is that
we are left with the sunk cost in the profit function of each firm, and thus in the explanatory
variables of the estimated equation. In the next paragraph, I will propose a way to model the
sunk cost that is coherent with the phenomenon I am willing to identify.
The second point to clarify concerns the modeling of the channel through which immigrants
networks affect a firm’s decision to start exporting. As noted by Rauch (2001) in his survey
of business and social networks in international trade, “empirical research into the impact of
networks on international trade has tended to lead theorizing”. What are the mechanisms
through which immigrants may favor trade between the immigration and the home country?
Two main channels are mentioned in the literature: immigrants may favor imports from their
origin country because of their preferences for the goods they know, and immigrants may en-
hance exports to their home country because they may transfer country and industry specific
information to local entrepreneurs. This paper is based on the analysis of export data, and will
therefore concentrate on identifying the second channel. Wagner et al. (2002) summarize the
reasons for which immigrants may enhance exports to their home country. First, they have a
better knowledge of business opportunities at home, with a facility to find customers for the
exported goods. Second, immigrants are better informed about the business practices in their
origin country, thus about the people to trust and those not to trust. Third, immigrants are
familiar with the culture, the habits, and the values of their former compatriots. Fourth, they
have the knowledge about local institutions and laws. Finally, immigrants have less communi-
cation barriers because of they speak the language spoken in the home country. The first four
channels refer to information costs, while the fifth represents a transaction cost. In the empirical
analysis, I will not be able to distinguish among these five potential influence channels, however
I will use control variables in order to ensure that the effect captured by the immigrants variable
is not due to another, omitted variable.
Now that we described how immigrants affect exports in general, the next step is to detail
the channel through which immigrants impact the profit of the firm. Theory does not describe
whether immigrants networks affect the firm’s profit through the variable or the fixed cost.
The usual assumption states that networks impact the profit of a firm through a non-price
mechanism. We also know that it is a variable specific to a country, which affects a given
region.
In this paper, I choose to model the immigrants networks as acting through the fixed cost.
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In the following I explain how I control for the possible diffusion channels in the variable cost,
and detail how the networks affect the fixed cost at exporting. Let us now model a firm’s export
behavior. A firm i starts to export to a country j if the present value of future profits is larger
than the sunk entry cost fj . Assuming the absence of uncertainty on future profits, the present
value of profits can be written as profits divided by the discount rate: Π/r. The probability
that a firm starts to export to country j is then
Pr(Sij = 1) = Pr(Πij/r > fj), (1)
where Sij is an indicator variable which takes the value 1 if firm i starts to export to country
j at time t. Written in logs,
Pr (Sij = 1) = Pr (lnΠij > ln r + ln fj) , (2)
The profit of the firm in equation (2) is specified using the trade model with heterogeneous
firms based on the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman monopolistic competition framework. Written in
logs, the estimable expression for the profit writes:
lnΠij = β + β1 ln ai + β2 lnwi + β3 ln dij + β4 lnµj + β5 lnPj + β6 lnYj (3)
where ai is the productivity of the firm, wi the wage, dij the distance between the firm and
the country, and µj , Pj and Yj country specific variables referring respectively to the share of
expenditure spent on manufactured goods, the price index, and total expenditures.
The fixed cost fj is defined as a function of the number of immigrants in the region. The
more numerous the immigrants from country j in region r, the lower the fixed cost to start
exporting to j. Written in logs, the fixed cost writes:
ln fj = γ0 − γ1 ln immrj + εijt, (4)
where εijt contains the effects specific to firms, places, countries, and years, and immrj is the
number of immigrants from country j residing in the French region r.
Incorporating (3) and (4) in (2), and passing the discount rate in the constant, we obtain
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the estimable equation:
Pr (Sijt = 1) = Pr (β0 + β1 ln ait + β2 lnwit + β3 ln dij (5)
+β4 lnµj + β5 lnPj + β6 lnYjt + γ1 ln immrj > εijt)
Equation (5) is estimated using a logit. ait is the apparent productivity of labor of the firm,
which I measure through value added divided by the number of employees. I add the size of the
firm, eit, as an additional proxy to productivity. I expect both variables to impact positively the
probability to start exporting. wit it the wage, measured as total remunerations divided by the
number of employees. Note that the wage was used during the estimation but does not appear
in the final results. Its coefficient was most of the time not significant, and did not increase the
explanatory power of the estimations. dij is the distance between the firm and the destination
country, and I expect the coefficient to be negative. µj , and Pj correspond respectively to the
share of expenditures allocated to industrial goods, and to the industrial price index. I make
the difficult assumption that both variables are constant through time and that their effect
will be taken into account by the country dummy used in the estimation. Yjt refers to total
expenditures, and the time invariant part of it will also be controlled for by the country dummy.
Finally, immrj is the number of immigrants of country j living in the de´partement r in 1982.
The main expected result concerns the coefficient γ1, which should be positive and significant
if immigrants networks have a positive effect on the export behavior of firms.
3 Data and stylized facts
The data comes from three sources.
First, the French firm-level export data for the period 1986-1992 are collected by the Cus-
toms and are available at INSEE. These are French export flows aggregated by firm, year and
destination country. I match exports with information on firms from the EAE (Enqueˆtes An-
nuelles d’Entreprises): sales, number of employees, Siren identification number, address of the
firm. To these data I add information on importing countries and trade costs: For the 61 coun-
tries of the database, I use the gross domestic product (gdp) to proxy demand. Trade costs
are proxied by distance between the firm and the country, as well as three dummy variables for
European Community membership (EC), common language and former colony. Later in the
preferred specification, I will use country dummies to take account of all the country specific
characteristics. Two indicator variables are created, one for the decision to export to a country
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at time t, EXPijt, and one for the decision to start to export to a country in t, Sijt. The latter
equals 1 when EXPijt−1 = 0 and EXPijt = 1, equals 0 when EXPijt−1 = 0 and EXPijt = 0,
and is missing when the firm stops exporting to j or continues to export to j. Table 1 summa-
rizes the number of firms in each of the sample years. 48% of the single-region firms of more
than 20 employees start to export to one (or more) of the 61 countries of the database in 1987,
50% in 1988 and 51% in 1989. Note that these statistics are representative of large firms only
(more than 20 employees).
Figure 1: Summary statistics on firms
year firms starters percent.
1987 16.698 8076 48%
1988 17.256 8710 50%
1989 17.515 8998 51 %
The third source of data relates to the main explanatory variable. Every 8 or 9 years,
INSEE makes a national population census which allows to collect information on a very large
set of variables, among which the nationality of the people living in each region. I use the 1982
census, which concerns a representative sample of a quarter of the French population. Three
variables are used for the empirical analysis: the number of people of each nationality residing
in each de´partement, the age of each person, given in ranges of 5 years (0 to 4, 5 to 9, 10 to 14,
etc...), and the education level attained by each person in the de´partement (coded, so that the
lowest number be no degree). 61 foreign countries are represented in the database. The stock
of immigrants of each country is used as the variable to proxy immigrants networks. Age and
education of those immigrants are averaged for each home country and de´partement. When there
are no immigrants from a given country in a de´partement, the age and education observations
are reported as missing. Dropping all French-born citizens, I remain with information on the
number of people who are either foreign at the time of the census or who have been naturalized
French but were born in another country. The French citizens born abroad are indeed also
likely to transfer information about their birth country, and this is why I include them in the
immigrants population together with the foreign citizens living in France.
Tables 6 and 7 summarize the distribution of immigrants across de´partements. Countries
are ordered in decreasing order according to the average number of immigrants in de´partements
(second column). The Tables are split in two parts. The four columns on the left correspond
to the minimum, average and maximum number of immigrants of the given country in regions,
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while the four columns on the right display the minimum, average and maximum shares of
immigrants in total regional population. I use the number of immigrants as the explanatory
variable, and so does the major part of the literature. However some studies like Godart and
Toubal for example use the share of immigrants, which refers more to the density of the immi-
grant population. As displayed in Table 6, the Algerians2 are the largest immigrant population
in France in 1982, with an average of 9347 Algerians in each de´partement. The second most
numerous foreign populations are the Portuguese and the Italians. Note that the fifth col-
umn of the Table gives us information on the way foreign populations are distributed among
de´partements. The coefficient of variation is computed as the standard deviation divided by
the average number of immigrants. Hence, a low coefficient of variation says that the number
of immigrants does not vary much compared to the average number: immigrants are relatively
dispersed on the territory. On the contrary, a large coefficient of variation indicates that the
foreign population is agglomerated in few de´partements. For example, we can see that the some
of the largest foreign populations are quite dispersed: Portuguese, Italians and Spaniards have
a coefficient of variation around 1.4. On the other side, Japanese and Comorians are among the
more agglomerated foreign populations, with a coefficient of variation respectively at 5.6 and
5.4.
Now that we illustrated the spatial distribution of immigrants among French de´partements,
let us see whether the de´partements containing the largest number of immigrants are also the
ones in which firms start to export most to the country of origin. Figures 2 and 3 display
the relation between the number of firms that started to export to a given country and the
number of immigrants, respectively, in each French de´partement. I graphed this relationship
for six countries, chosen for the interesting features they display. The numbers inside the
Figures refer to the code of the region (de´partement). First, note that for all but one country,
the de´partement ‘75” (Paris intra-muros) contains the largest number of immigrants. Only
for Belgians, the largest de´partement is “59”, called Nord, at the Belgian border. All figures
display an increasing relationship between the number of immigrants and the number of firms
that started to export to the country. For Portugal and Algeria, the points are nicely aligned
on the regression line. On the opposite, for China and Japan, the relationship is less visible.
This could be imputed to the lower variability in both of the variables. For instance, in several
regions, there are 0 firms that start to export to China, the same for Japan, which explains the
2Recall that the numer corresponding to each foreign population refers to the number of foreigners plus the
number of foreign-born French citizens. Hence the number of Algerians comprises the French naturalized citizens
born in Algeria.
10
vertical lines formed by the dots. Finally, let us highlight that two other de´partements besides
Paris contain repeatedly a large number of firms that start to export: these are “59”, the North,
with Lille, a major French city, and “69”, the de´partement around the city of Lyon.
In the following section we will analyse whether the observed link between the number of
starts and the regional stock of immigrants is not caused by another, unobserved variable.
For instance, the reasons for which immigrants are attracted to some regions could also be
explanations for the active export behavior of firms in that region. In Table 1 I illustrate
some of the characteristics of de´partements : total population, gross domestic product, gdp per
capita, area and unemployment. De´partements are ordered in decreasing order according to
their total number of immigrants. Only the 15 first and the 15 last de´partements are shown.
Paris is the first de´partement in terms of immigrants in 1982, with 422.908 citizens born in one
of the 61 countries in our sample. It is the second largest de´partement after “Nord” in terms
of population. All the de´partements pertaining to Ile-de-France figure among the 15 largest
de´partements in terms of immigrants. They are also the largest in terms of total population.
The first circle of de´partements around Paris (“Seine -St-Denis”, “Hauts-de-Seine” and “Val-
de-Marne”) comes before the second circle, in parallel to three non-Parisian de´partements:
“Bouches-du-Rhoˆne”, “Rhone” and “Nord”. In sum, the first regions in terms of immigrants
are tightly related to the first regions in terms of total population. In terms of gdp, the number
of immigrants decrease with the gdp and the gdp per capita, with some exceptions, and not
so closely as for total population. The size of de´partements measured as physical area does
not seem to impact the number of immigrants. This stylized fact is driven by the small size of
the de´partements in Ile-de-France, which are the only de´partements to have been created after
the others. 83 de´partements were originally created in 1790. The Parisian region stretched out
on three de´partements, which were transformed into 8 smaller de´partements in 1964. Finally,
unemployment is not a good predictor of the number of immigrants, as low unemployment rates
can be found in the first, largest regions as well as in the remote, smaller regions.
Let us now turn to estimation in order to investigate whether there is a robust link between
export behavior and number of immigrants.
4 Estimation Results
I now detail the method used to identify the networks phenomenon. In the following, the origin
country for all export flows will be named country F . The theoretical equation spells that if
there is an effect of immigrants networks on the decision to start exporting to a given country,
11
Figure 2: Regional stock of immigrants and firms’ export behavior, I
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Figure 3: Regional stock of immigrants and firms’ export behavior, II
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Table 1: Summary statistics on de´partements
Departement code Tot imm Nb start pop gdp gdpcap area unemp
First 15 departements ...
PARIS 75 422908 2332 2176652 60318 27444 105 7.1
SEINE-ST-DENIS 93 264416 497 1326548 13414 10067 236 6.9
B.-DU-RHONE 13 235488 445 1719856 m. m. 5087 10.3
HAUTS-DE-SEINE 92 220412 606 1386244 26770 19303 175 5.2
NORD 59 217216 1227 2516908 24113 9557 5742 9.4
RHONE 69 201996 1048 1441624 17098 11793 3249 5.7
VAL-DE-MARNE 94 184720 504 1192692 13047 10885 245 5.4
YVELINES 78 153860 366 1196828 12530 10565 2284 3.8
MOSELLE 57 152008 250 1008500 9288 9183 6216 8.3
ALPES-MARITIMES 06 137636 272 879544 m. m. 4298 11
ISERE 38 136516 602 936728 9653 10250 7431 5.9
VAL-D’OISE 95 127376 447 918352 7807 8439 1245 5.4
ESSONNE 91 109784 392 987988 9311 9456 1804 5.1
SEINE-ET-MARNE 77 98172 475 885764 8889 9943 5915 5.4
HAUTE-GARONNE 31 87896 177 820480 8410 10186 6309 8.4
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
Last 15 departements ...
NIEVRE 58 9008 88 237584 1843 7610 6816 7.1
ORNE 61 8624 129 295684 2564 8642 6103 7.5
VIENNE 86 8564 132 371632 3271 8768 6990 9
HAUTES-ALPES 05 7656 20 105372 m. m. 5548 6.2
HAUTE-LOIRE 43 7052 144 205900 1398 6763 4977 6.4
DEUX-SEVRES 79 6844 134 341124 2705 7839 5999 7.7
INDRE 36 6528 99 242592 2038 8484 6790 6.4
MANCHE 50 5172 75 464880 3804 8247 5938 6.6
MORBIHAN 56 4516 95 589316 5012 8478 6822 8.9
VENDEE 85 3972 227 483156 3590 7382 6719 6.6
COTES-D’ARMOR 22 3740 37 539660 4392 8085 6877 8.1
LOZERE 48 3620 0 74156 542 7285 5166 5.6
CREUSE 23 2864 44 139108 898 6475 5565 6.8
CANTAL 15 2696 27 163128 1080 6609 5726 7
MAYENNE 53 2584 120 270932 2326 8614 5175 5.1
Note: GDP is in mio. ECU, GDP per capita in ECU per hab, in 1982.
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I should observe a positive relationship between the presence of immigrants from country j in
region r and the probability that a firm i from region r starts to export to country j. However,
in order to see whether there is a robust relationship between the two variables, we need to check
two elements related to the endogeneity of the variables. First, we need to be sure that the
effect captured by the immigrants variable is not due to an omitted variable that would lead to
the same observed relationship between immigrants and the probability to export. Second, we
need to check whether the causality goes in the right direction: do immigrants favor exporting
or does exporting lead to more immigrants.
Other variables, observable or unobservable, might cause a positive relationship between
firms’ export behavior and the presence of foreign immigrants in the region. These variables
can be classified into three categories: region r-specific factors, country j-specific factors, and
factors specific to the couple region r-country j. The first group of factors refers to characteristics
that are specific to region r and that do not vary in any time or destination dimension: regional
natural advantages or man-made advantages (transport infrastructure, availability of services..)
are elements that attract immigrants from all countries to region r and that are also correlated
with the presence of a large number of exporting firms. We thus want to control for these factors
in order for the networks variable not to capture another mechanism. The second group of factors
consists in characteristics of country j that do not vary in time and that concern all regions
r inside the exporting country. For example, historical ties between country F and country j
like a colonial past, cultural links (common language) and trade agreements are all reasons that
will draw country j-immigrants to country F , and that are also likely to generate more exports
from F to j. Therefore we also want to control for these factors. The last group of factors refers
to elements that vary with a pair region r-country j, like our variable of interest. Intranational
distance (mostly for border countries) is likely to favor immigration from the foreign country
to region r and also to favor exports from region r to country j. Historical links between r
and j like city twinning (administrative link between foreign city pairs) also. I will attempt to
control for most of these effects, by incorporating distance in the list of explanatory variables
for example. However without data on city twinnings, it may be that the effect captured by
the immigrants variable is in part due to this phenomenon, which is also specific to the couple
region r-country j.
While the main objective is to control for omitted variable bias, it is also important to ensure
that coefficients on firm-level variables are correctly estimated. Indeed, firm specific factors due
to heterogeneity are likely to influence the export decision, and if not controlled for could be
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attributed to productivity. A good CEO running a productive firm who has studied in Germany
and has built a good knowledge of the country, may start to export there, and this decision may
not be directly linked with the productivity of the firm but with the personal contacts of the
CEO.
In order to control for the factors cited above, we introduce sequentially the following ele-
ments. Dummies for years control for the intertemporal variability of firm specific and country
specific variables. Regional characteristics and firm heterogeneity are controlled by the inclusion
of firm fixed effects. Finally, country dummies will capture the specificities of countries that do
not vary with exporting firms and time.
The other problem related to endogeneity is reverse causality. Indeed, it could be argued
that the firms that are interested in exporting to a given country j are also active in bringing to
their region people originating from country j, in order to facilitate contacts with people abroad.
This case is interesting and very related to ours, but it is not the mechanism we want to identify.
Therefore, the possibility of reverse causality should be controlled for. I want to identify the
flows of information from the immigrants present on the region in 1987, 1988 and 1989, to local
entrepreneurs that then start to export. In order not to have the reverse causality, I thus want to
remain with the part of the immigrants variable that is exogenous and not caused by exporting
in 1987, 1988 and 1989. One possibility would be to instrument the stock of immigrants in 1987,
1988 and 1989 with the stock of immigrants in a year previous to 1987, and thus to predict the
values for the three years from that lagged value. Another possibility is to use a lagged variable
right away. In the following regressions, the current immigrants variable comes from the 1982
census. Hence, although it is not a proper instrumental variable, it does control for the reverse
causality in that the immigrants present in the region in 1982 could hardly have arrived because
of the export behavior of the firms in 1987.
Estimation results are shown in Table 2, which gradually adds controls in order to obtain the
preferred specification. The dependent variable is an indicator taking to value 1 if the firm starts
to export to country j in t, with t = 1986, 1987, 1988. The explanatory variables related to firm
and country characteristics refer to the same year in which the firms consider exporting, and the
immigrants variable refers to the stock of immigrants in 1982. In the first column, equation (5)
is estimated with dummies for years and industries. The coefficient on the immigrants variable
is positive and significant, however the effect might be due to regional characteristics. The use
of firm fixed effects in the second column ensures that firm and at the same time region specific
characteristics are controlled for. The effect of immigrants remains positive and significant. In
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Table 2: The effect of immigrants networks on the export decision
Dependent Variable: Sijt
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4)
productivity 0.806a 0.014 0.019 0.020
ait = ln(va/emplit) (0.009) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027)
size 0.595a 0.068c 0.081b 0.092b
ln(emplit) (0.005) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037)
distance -0.625a -0.801a -0.693a -0.607a
ln(dij) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.023)
demand 0.275a 0.355a 0.474a 0.523a
yjt = ln(GDPjt) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.072)
immigrants 0.119a 0.140a 0.015a 0.124a
ln(immrj) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
European Community 0.930a
(0.013)
language 1.249a
(0.014)
colony 0.074a
(0.016)
Year dummy yes yes yes yes
Industry dummy yes n/a n/a n/a
Firm FE no yes yes yes
Country dummy no no no yes
N 2751129 1837730 1837730 1837730
Note: Standard errors in parentheses with a, b and c respectively denoting significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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the third column, I add other components of trade costs, i.e three dummies for the countries that
share a common border with France, the French-speaking countries and the countries that were
former French colonies. The inclusion of these variables divide the coefficient on immigrants by
10, however it remains significant. Finally, in the last column I use country dummies additionally
to the firm fixed effects. The effect of the immigrants variable is then identified on the variability
of the variable between firms and countries. The coefficient re-increases compared to column 4.
Hence, controlling for potential effects due to unobserved variables, the presence of immigrants
increases the probability that a firm starts exporting to the immigrants’ home country. These
result comfort the existing results in the literature about the immigrants effect on trade flows.
The magnitude of the effect can be evaluated by computing the elasticity of the probability to
start exporting with respect to the number of immigrants: η = βˆ(1−Pr), with βˆ the estimated
coefficient and Pr the probability to start exporting. The average value of the probability to
start exporting to a country j being 0.007 in this case when referring to the estimation in column
4, we obtain an elasticity of 0.123. This means that a 10% increase in the number of immigrants
in a region generates in average a 1.23% increase in the probability to start exporting.
5 The age and skills of immigrants
This section explores how the effect of immigrants on firm-level trade varies with the age and
education level of immigrants. Indeed, we are trying to identify a phenomenon through which
immigrants bring information to local entrepreneurs in the home country. We can therefore ex-
pect that the amount of information that is transferred depends on the amount of information
immigrants have, as well as on the ability of immigrants to relay information. The literature pro-
vides evidence of an increasing effect of immigrants on trade with different variables measuring
the experience and skill level of immigrants. Head and Ries (1998) investigate how heteroge-
neous characteristics of immigrants in Canada change the magnitude of trade creation. They
find that independent immigrants have more impact on trade than family immigrants. They
interpret this as independent immigrants having a larger ability to stimulate exports than the
average immigrant. Herander and Saavedra (2005) measure experience by the average length of
stay and skills by the share of immigrants employed in skilled occupations. Both variables have
a positive and significant effect on trade. In the following, I proxy the amount of information
by an interaction variable containing the stock of immigrants multiplied by the average age of
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the immigrants in the region (both variables in logs). The estimated equation becomes:
Pr (Sijt = 1) = Pr (α0 + α1 ln ait + α2 ln eit + α3 ln dij + α4 ln yjt (6)
+α5 ln immrj + α6 ln agerj ∗ ln immrj > εijt) ,
I thus assume that the older the immigrants, the more information they have on their home
country, either through life experience or through education. I expect the interaction term
to have a positive and significant coefficient. Then, in a separate estimation I also proxy the
amount of information immigrants have and their ability to transfer information by their level
of education. The level of education is measured by a variable that codes the diploma obtained
by each person. In a given region, the diploma variable is the average diploma obtained by
the foreign population. I include an interaction term containing the average education level
multiplied by the immigrants’ stock, and I expect the coefficient on the interaction variable
to be positive and significant. Table 3 displays the results of both estimations, using firm
fixed effects and dummies for years and countries. The coefficient on the immigrants variable
is positive and significant for both estimations. More importantly, the coefficients on both
interaction terms are also positive and significant. Hence, the effect of immigrants on export
behavior is enhanced by the age and education level of immigrants.
6 Variation across industries and countries
The differing impact of immigrants on trade flows according to industries is a robust result
of the literature. Gould (1994), Dunlevy and Hutchinson (1999) and Rauch and Trindade
(2002) all find that immigrants have stronger effect on trade in sectors which can be considered
producing differentiated products. In this section I investigate whether this effect is present
when using firm-level trade data. The theoretical prediction states that in sectors in which
goods are highly substitutable, consumers are not likely to need much information in order to
decide on the variety they buy. On the contrary, information is much more likely to be valuable
for differentiated goods.
In order ton confront the data with this prediction, we need a measure of the degree of goods
substitution in each sector. One possibility would be to use the typical estimates of elasticities
of substitution obtained from trade flows. However, according to Chaney (2005), “interpreting
the elasticity of trade flows with respect to trade barriers in gravity equations as a measure of
the elasticity of substitution is incorrect” (Chaney, 2005, page 21). Indeed, he emphasizes that
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Table 3: The effect of immigrants networks on the export decision
Dependent Variable: Sijt
Model : (1) (2)
productivity 0.014 0.014
ait = ln(va/emplit) (0.027) (0.027)
size 0.090b 0.090b
ln(emplit) (0.038) (0.038)
distance -0.555a -0.597a
ln(dij) (0.026) (0.024)
demand 0.521a 0.521a
yjt = ln(GDPjt) (0.075) (0.075)
immigrants 0.097a 0.144a
ln(immrj) (0.018) (0.007)
age * immigrants 0.018a
ln(agerj) ∗ ln(immrj) (0.005)
diploma * immigrants 0.007a
ln(diprj) ∗ ln(immrj) (0.002)
Firm fixed effects
Dummies: years + countries
N 1599488 1591887
Note: Standard errors in parentheses with a, b and c re-
spectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels.
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when considering not only the intensive margin but also the extensive margin of trade, the
elasticity of trade flows with respect to trade costs is different from the traditional σ and even
reacts inversely to it.
I thus use two different measures of the degree of goods differentiation. The first one is based
on the goods classification established by Rauch (1999). Rauch classifies four-digits industries
into three classes of goods: homogenous with a reference price quoted on organized exchange,
homogenous with a reference price quoted in trade publications, and differentiated goods. I
change these classes to numerical values so that 1 corresponds to the most homogenous goods
and 3 to differentiated goods. Then I multiply this index by the number of 4-digits categories
inside each 2-digits industry. The resulting index measures the degree of goods differentiation.
The second measure of goods differentiation is the elasticity of substitution, computed based
on Chaney’s (2005) predictions. According to his model, the elasticities of aggregated sectoral
trade flows with respect to variable costs estimated by Hummels (1999), refer to the index
of sectoral heterogeneity γ. Knowing γ for each sector, I am able to compute σ by using the
relationship between the size of a firm and its rank within the size distribution, given by Chaney
(2005) page 20:
ln
(
Rankhi /Nh
)
= ah − γh
σh − 1 ln
(
sizehi
)
(7)
.
As emphasized by the author, estimating this equation provides us with an estimator of
γh
σh−1 . I estimate this equation for the 33 sectors in the sample, and use the γs available in
Hummels (1999) to obtain the σs for each industry.
Both measures of goods differentiation are added to the estimation of the preferred speci-
fication, through the inclusion of an interaction term. The interaction variable comprises the
log of immigrants multiplied by the sectoral elasticity of substitution, or the log of immigrants
multiplied by index computed from Rauch’s classification. Results are shown in Table 4. The
coefficient on the interaction term for σ is expected to be negative and significant: an increase
in the elasticity of substitution should decrease the effect of immigrants on trade. The resulting
coefficient has the expected sign, and is significant at the 5% level. Figure 4 illustrates graph-
ically the relationship between both variables. The negative slope confirms the result found
in the estimation, however it is poorly significantly negative. Results concerning the second
interaction variable are less convincing. The coefficient on the index of goods differentiation
based on Rauch’s classification is expected to be positive and significant: an increase in the
degree of goods differentiation should increase the effect of immigrants on the decision to start
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exporting. As Table 4 shows, the coefficient is instead equal to zero. Hence only one out of two
estimations assesses that the effect of immigrants on firm level trade is higher for differentiated
goods. It might also be the case that the numerical measure of goods differentiation obtained
from Rauch’s classification is not adequate, and in further work I plan to continue the analysis
in order to obtain consistent results from different measures of goods differentiation .
Figure 4: Elasticity of the probability to start exporting with respect to the local stock of
immigrants, differing among industries
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Finally, some studies test the hypothesis that the immigrants effect on trade differs among
origin countries. The theoretical predictions concerning the the impact of immigrants of different
regions of the world are however not clear-cut. The information provided by immigrants can
interact with trade costs in two opposite ways. One could argue that when trade costs are low,
information on the home country has a large marginal impact on the export behavior of local
producers precisely because the foreign market is already easily accessible. On the other side,
one could also argue that the information transferred by immigrants to local producers is more
useful when trade costs are large than when trade costs are low: hence a increasing marginal
impact with the level of trade costs. The literature contains both sets of results. Head and
Ries (1998) find ‘great diversity in the trade effects of increased immigration’, but no systematic
trend with respect to trade costs. Girma and Yu (2002) support the first hypothesis. They show
that immigrants from non-Commonwealth countries positively impact U.K. trade flows while
immigrants from the Commonwealth have a negative effect on trade. They explain this result by
assuming that non-Commonwealth immigrants bring information that can act efficiently on local
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Table 4: The effect of immigrants networks on the export decision, by industry
Dependent Variable: Sijt
productivity 0.030 0.019
ait = ln(va/emplit) (0.028) (0.027)
size 0.085b 0.093b
ln(emplit) (0.038) (0.037)
distance -0.601a -0.603a
ln(dij) (0.024) (0.023)
demand 0.540a 0.514a
yjt = ln(GDPjt) (0.074) (0.072)
immigrants 0.133a 0.130a
ln(immrj) (0.009) (0.006)
sigma* immigrants -0.002b
σ ∗ ln(immrj) (0.001)
Rauch* immigrants 0.000
R ∗ ln(immrj) (0.000)
Firm fixed effects
Dummies: years + countries
N 1683285 1825374
Note: Standard errors in parentheses with a, b and c respec-
tively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels.
entrepreneurs precisely because these countries share high trade costs with the U.K. I investigate
this question by dividing the immigrants variable into a set of variables, each corresponding to
a given region of the world. Then I estimate the usual preferred specification (including firm
fixed effects, dummies for years and countries), and the results are shown in Table 5. All the
estimates on immigrants are positive and significant, showing that increases in immigrants from
all origins are trade-creating. The strongest effect comes from immigrants from North America
(USA, Canada). While Head and Ries (1998) find a negative effect of immigrants of the CEECs
on Canadian trade, I obtain a positive coefficient, however it is the lowest among all. This
might be due to the fact that in 1982 there were quite a large number of Polish immigrants in
France arrived at the beginning of the century, however the level of trade was not so high until
1989. One possibility is that the effect of CEECs immigrants on trade becomes higher after
1990, and I will investigate this hypothesis in further work. The rest of the coefficients are quite
similar, around 0.110. Hence an 10% increase in the stock of immigrants from a specific country
increases the probability to start exporting to that country by 1%.
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Table 5: The effect of immigrants networks on the export decision
Dependent Variable: Sijt
productivity 0.020
ait = ln(va/emplit) (0.026)
size 0.092b
ln(emplit) (0.036)
distance -0.629a
ln(dij) (0.024)
demand 0.522a
yjt = ln(GDPjt) (0.072)
Immigrants from...
European Community 0.103a
(0.008)
EEA 0.113a
(0.007)
Middle East 0.151a
(0.010)
CEECs 0.082a
(0.028)
Africa 0.115a
(0.006)
South America 0.106a
(0.114)
North America 0.218a
(0.013)
Central America 0.155a
(0.018)
Asia 0.136a
(0.019)
China, Japan, Australia 0.127a
(0.010)
Firm FE, Dummies for years and countries
N 1837730
Note: Standard errors in parentheses with a, b and c respec-
tively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels.
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7 Conclusion
The trade and networks literature provides strong evidence that social and business networks
can impact export flows at the regional and national levels. The intuition behind this evidence
is that immigrants can either transfer information to local entrepreneurs or create their own
business and thus favor the export performance of the region or nation. Up to now, however,
the evidence was restricted to aggregate studies based on intranational or international trade
data. In this paper, the availability of firm-level export data allows us to investigate whether
the aggregated phenomenon is backed up by micro-level evidence. Using French exports at the
firm-level to 61 countries, I find that increasing the number of foreign immigrants in the region
by 10% increases the probability that a firm starts exporting to the immigrants’ home country
by 1.2%. More, I show that the impact of immigrants is enhanced when immigrants are older
and among all more educated. The impact of immigrants does vary among sectors, and the link
with the elasticity of substitution is found positive for one out of two variables measuring the
degree of goods differentiation. Finally, the trade-creating effect of immigrants differ between
regions of the world. North-American immigrants have the strongest impact on trade: a 10%
increase in US citizens in a French region increases in average the probability to start exporting
to the US by 2%.
These results are interesting in three respects. First, the positive impact of immigrants on
trade is consistent with previous empirical literature. Second, it is shown that immigrants affect
the probability to start exporting, and thus the number of firms that export to each country.
The fact that the number of exporting firms is affected by the local stock of immigrants is a
sufficient condition for the aggregate-level phenomenon to exist. Third, it opens a path towards
more research concerning the mechanism through which immigrants stimulate aggregate trade
flows. The next step is to understand whether the presence of foreign populations has a larger
effect on the number of exporting firms or on the volume exported by each producer, i.e. whether
immigrants affect in major part the extensive or the intensive margins of trade.
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Table 6: Summary statistics on foreign population in regions - countries 1 to 30
pays min Nb avg Nb max Nb var. Nb min Sh avg Sh max Sh var. Sh
DZA 128 9347 82276 1.7 .000467 .011526 .062023 1
PRT 452 8859 56596 1.4 .000889 .013824 .047452 .75
ITA 172 7910 57372 1.5 .000635 .012543 .065229 1.1
ESP 208 6331 42628 1.4 .000563 .011556 .113332 1.4
MAR 192 4891 32296 1.3 .000555 .007506 .023297 .66
TUN 24 2491 42392 2.4 .000099 .002706 .020624 1.5
POL 36 2393 32648 2.1 .000164 .003166 .023159 1.1
TUR 0 1425 11816 1.4 0 .002482 .012938 1.1
UEBL 48 1239 26700 2.3 .000272 .001761 .012191 1.1
DEU 16 1098 16792 2 .0002 .00149 .01665 1.4
VNM 4 586 8524 2 .000026 .000704 .003916 1
GBR 8 471 8016 2.1 .000058 .000605 .003683 1.1
KHM 0 465 12848 3 0 .000516 .005903 1.5
LAO 0 392 3716 1.4 0 .000617 .003614 1.1
CHE 12 392 4436 1.8 .000039 .000726 .008975 1.7
SEN 0 375 7776 2.7 0 .000366 .003572 1.8
MLI 0 267 8576 4.3 0 .000222 .006465 3.5
USA 8 236 7456 3.4 .000025 .000264 .003425 1.5
NLD 8 207 1484 1.3 .000023 .000375 .00179 .89
GRC 0 183 5316 3.4 0 .000167 .002442 1.9
LBN 0 182 5516 3.4 0 .000171 .002534 1.9
CMR 0 171 3488 3 0 .000146 .001839 2.3
MUS 0 169 4200 3 0 .000157 .00193 1.9
HUN 4 150 2500 2 4.8e-06 .000182 .001149 1
CIV 0 139 3940 3.3 0 .000126 .00181 2
IRN 0 126 4688 4 0 .000111 .002154 2.4
ROM 0 126 4684 4 0 .000118 .002152 2.1
MDG 0 111 1404 1.9 0 .000134 .000645 1
EGY 0 95 3152 3.8 0 .000083 .001448 2.4
AUT 0 93 1488 2 0 .00012 .000684 1.1
Note: Nb is number, Sh is share, var. is coefficient of variation =
sd/mean. Countries are sorted in decreasing order of the average
share of foreign population.
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Table 7: Summary statistics on foreign population in regions - countries 31 to 61
pays min Nb avg Nb max Nb var. Nb min Sh avg Sh max Sh var. Sh
SYR 0 76 1124 2.4 0 .000085 .001111 1.8
CHN 0 76 3472 4.8 0 .000064 .001595 2.7
CHL 0 76 1104 2.2 0 .000086 .000614 1.6
JPN 0 75 3868 5.6 0 .000053 .001777 3.8
ISR 0 71 2376 3.8 0 .000055 .001092 2.7
IND 0 63 1164 2.4 0 .000072 .000535 1.4
CAN 0 63 1360 2.4 0 .000083 .000625 1.3
TGO 0 63 924 2.5 0 .000062 .000592 1.8
ARG 0 62 2028 3.5 0 .000067 .000932 1.7
MRT 0 59 1308 3.4 0 .000053 .000968 2.5
HTI 0 55 1792 4.1 0 .000044 .000823 3
BRA 0 52 2032 4 0 .000054 .000934 1.9
BEN 0 51 824 2.5 0 .000052 .00044 1.8
SWE 0 49 1064 3 0 .000058 .000719 1.9
PAK 0 44 860 2.9 0 .000042 .000482 2.3
GAB 0 37 540 2.1 0 .000042 .000272 1.6
DNK 0 33 564 2.5 0 .00004 .000505 1.8
BGR 0 30 788 3 0 .000031 .000362 1.6
COM 0 27 1376 5.4 0 .00002 .0008 4.3
COL 0 26 904 3.7 0 .000025 .000415 1.9
MEX 0 25 968 4.1 0 .000023 .000445 2.2
CAF 0 24 276 2.1 0 .000029 .000279 1.8
IRL 0 23 536 2.6 0 .000029 .000246 1.2
VEN 0 22 768 3.8 0 .000021 .000353 2.2
IRQ 0 21 604 3.3 0 .000021 .000277 2.3
NER 0 20 416 2.5 0 .000021 .000191 1.5
FIN 0 18 476 3.1 0 .00002 .000219 1.6
NOR 0 17 364 2.5 0 .00002 .000181 1.6
AUS 0 15 408 3 0 .000016 .000187 1.7
TCD 0 13 196 2.2 0 .000015 .00009 1.6
NGA 0 7.7 136 2.4 0 .000011 .000063 1.5
Note: Nb is number, Sh is share, var. is coefficient of variation =
sd/mean. Countries are sorted in decreasing order of the average
share of foreign population.
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